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For the last thirty-five years or so, social memories have become more “problematic” 
—at least to manage— in France. French historian Jean-Pierre Rioux in his book 
La France perd la mémoire (France is Losing its Memory) situates this shift in the 
early 1970s and clearly laments challenges to traditional historiography or the 
Republican national “story.” Pierre Nora too, editor of the multi-volume Realms 
of Memory which has become a key reference work in memory studies, sees the 
1970s as inaugurating new relationships to the past in France—brought about by 
the death of President Charles de Gaulle, the social upheaval of May 1968, the 
end of grand narratives, the “acceleration of history,” and economic stagnation. 
As Nora puts it, there are “sites or realms of memory” because there are no 
longer “real environments of memory.”1 We should add that during the 1970s 
the questioning of the occlusions and comforting myths of the previous decades 
finally took place in the public sphere.2 Questioning the activities of the Vichy 
regime (1940-44) clearly dominated much memory work in France during the 
1970s and 1980s, due to the profound legacy of the Holocaust in Europe and 
complex ethical and practical issues relating to French involvement in it. 
More recently (essentially since the 1990s), a set of issues that can be grouped 
as (post)colonial have emerged more forcefully: for instance remembering, 
revisiting or re-evaluating the Franco-Algerian War (1954-62), the French 
Empire, slavery, or post-1945 immigration to France.3 Many of these historical 
debates, and especially the Algerian question—that take place in or through a 
variety of media such as films, novels, scholarship, commemorations, political 
declarations, activism, the media, and other channels or spheres—tend to be 
polemical as the periods considered are often still highly contested. 
The renewed interest in historical memory is perhaps a particularly significant 
issue in France for several reasons. Firstly, the French nation has traditionally drawn 
heavily on historical references for its support. Such historical references helped 
to draw together what has always been an extremely divided and diverse nation. 
It was only in the relatively recent French Third Republic that the Republican 
system of government was finally adopted, and even then only after decades of 
political battle. The cost, however, was high, with, for example, regional identities 
suppressed.4 Twentieth Century history, after the “Sacred Union” of World War 
One5, has proven equally divisive and in a more open and modern society the 
traditional model has broken down. For Nora “In truth, the traditional model 
of commemoration has shattered”.6 This model of commemoration has been 
destroyed and replaced by a more varied model that is “a splintered system, made 
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up of disparate commemorative languages, that assumes a different relationship 
to the past, more elective than imperative, open, flexible, alive, and continually 
being reworked”.7 French collective memory in general, therefore, appears to 
have become more fragmented, hence the use of the plural in the title of the 
third volume of Nora’s collection: Les Lieux de mémoire: Les France.  
While the traditional model of commemoration has broken down, the 
Republican paradigm is still quite resilient, albeit under pressure. This will be 
particularly relevant to my case study on (post)colonial memory, since one of 
the challenges to the Republican paradigm is precisely the (post)coloniality. As 
Alec Hargreaves points out, discussing ethnicity in the French Republic can be 
very difficult due to the focus on the individual citizen and general reticence to 
acknowledge intermediary groups between the State and the citizen.8 Similarly 
postcolonial theory has been slow to take hold in France9 and has only emerged 
in French in recent years.10 The old model is clearly under pressure. Its short 
term focus on forgetting and selective celebration of the Republic has proved 
inadequate over the last fifty years. This tradition of forgetting and repression—
Ernest Renan in his lecture “What is a Nation?” states that forgetting is necessary 
for a nation11—has left many unresolved issues. The Algerian War was amongst 
other things a “latent civil war;”12 it pitted French against French – for example, 
conscripts against putschists in 1961, or porteurs de valise13 against OAS - as well 
as Algerians against Algerians. Such divisive histories have long been repressed. 
The riots throughout many French cities in late 2005 showed the extent to 
which contemporary socio-economic exclusion actually functions along ethnic 
lines in France as well as the sheer scale of the problem. For several weeks 
pitched battles pitted young people living in the underprivileged outer suburbs 
(banlieues) of towns and cities against the police. Many of these young people 
are children or even now grand-children of migrants who came to France after 
World War Two from the then colonies of France such as Algeria.14 While such 
disturbances have been a regular occurrence since the early 1990s in a handful of 
particularly deprived suburbs such as Vénissieux on the outskirts of Lyon, 2005 
was the first time riots of such severity, intensity and duration engulfed towns 
and cities throughout France. President Chirac may have campaigned in the 
1995 Presidential campaign on a platform of combating the “social fracture,” 
however over a decade later these issues have clearly been exacerbated rather 
than addressed. The trauma and bitterness of the colonial era and its bloody 
end, while appearing to belong to a far off period, are in reality unresolved as 
both Benjamin Stora and Kristin Ross have argued.15 Stora highlights the links 
between actors in the Algerian War and the French National Front extreme right 
political party. Ross identifies a powerful narrative or a discourse in France that 
has portrayed modernization and Empire separately and that makes the Empire 
appear as “ancient history” rather than as an event that did not end cleanly, 
and that impacted very directly and centrally on the lives of many people now 
alive in France. More and more of work in Francophone (post)colonial studies 
is highlighting the link between the colonial period and contemporary issues in 
France, notably around race.16 Here I want to add to this scholarship through a 
case study of one (post)colonial “memory battle” around the Algerian War (1954-
1962).17 Through an analysis of various “vectors of memory” the paper argues that 
the recent upsurge in “memory work” in France is very much anchored in the 
present (post)colonial social context in France. That memory work is however 
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largely symbolic and in some ways unsatisfactory. It shows that much of the recent 
work of memory has been only belatedly and partially undertaken by the State, 
with civil society in some ways yet to follow. 
Recent Work of Memory in France: the Franco-Algerian War
Over forty-five years after the conflict ended, the Algerian War remains 
highly relevant to an understanding of contemporary French society due 
to its legacy, which has been difficult to work through and overcome. Yet its 
significance remains underestimated by many. Millions of people in today’s 
France fought in or lived through the conflict. It lasted nearly eight years and 
was a fiercely fought campaign that caused huge division in French society. The 
war engendered the collapse of the Fourth Republic and caused immense rifts 
in France and Algeria as different communities emerged: such as professional 
soldiers, conscripts, OAS members (a far-right group of settlers and disgruntled 
army officers that sought by increasingly desperate, violent, and illegal means 
to keep Algeria French),18 gaullists, porteurs de valise (French who supported 
Algerian nationalists), harkis (Algerians who fought for the French army), and 
pieds-noirs (settlers). These groups are still very evident in French society today, 
often having formed associations and communities that tend to be hostile to 
one another. The conclusion of the war effectively heralded the end of over 130 
years of French presence in Algeria and dealt the deathblow to the once mighty 
French Empire. Memories of the Algerian War now regularly (re)emerge directly 
in various polemical developments and debates in contemporary France. For 
example, the use of torture by the French army during the war was “discussed” 
in hundreds of articles during 2000-1 and later portrayed in Florent-Emilio Siri’s 
2008 film Ennemi Intime (Intimate Enemies).
The 1990s have witnessed an end to what Henry Rousso called the “obsession” 
with the Second World War, a shift that has occurred progressively over time due 
to a number of factors. A key turning point was undoubtedly the trial of Maurice 
Papon. In 1997 Frenchman Maurice Papon was finally tried in Bordeaux for his 
role as a civil servant during the Second World War. He was found guilty of 
crimes against humanity for his role in the deportation of Jews and served three 
years of a ten-year sentence in jail. In 2002 he was released early from jail on 
health reasons. He died five years later. Due to his age (he was eighty-seven years 
old when convicted), Papon’s trial was the last “great memory trial” related to 
the Second World War to occur in France. During the war Papon had been the 
second top official in the Bordeaux region (Secretary General of the Prefecture 
of Gironde). After the Second World War he was a colonial administrator in 
Algeria, then Head of Police in Paris—at the time of the demonstration of 17 
October 1961 when the French police killed dozens of Algerians in central Paris 
(an event whose painful legacy is examined in Michael Haneke’s film Caché 
[Hidden]). During the Papon trial, the events of 17 October 1961 were discussed 
in court and received significant media coverage. The prosecution lawyers 
introduced this topic by calling writer Jean-Luc Einaudi to testify about what he 
knew about Papon’s role on 17 October 1961. Einaudi, the author of La Bataille 
de Paris, became a pivotal witness in the trial. A journalist writing in the weekly 
magazine Le Point noted that the Algerian War was like Pandora’s box: “Thirty 
years after the signing of the Evian peace agreement, the Algerian War emerged 
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without warning in the witness stand during the Papon trial”.19 Trials have not 
been a significant way in which memory work concerning the Algerian War has 
occurred because of a series of amnesties passed by the French government from 
the 1960s to the 1980s that have protected everyone from being prosecuted for 
activities during the war.20 Maurice Papon subsequently tried, unsuccessfully, to 
sue Einaudi. This episode led to further media coverage. During the trial a French 
judge, who is by definition a State representative, acknowledged for the first time 
that there was a “massacre” in Paris on 17 October 1961.
If as historian Robert Frank has argued, the Franco-Algerian War was not 
forgotten but rather occluded and repressed, then 1997 marks a key turning 
point for a certain official recognition of a state of “war” in Algeria between 1954 
and 1962. For a very long time the Algerian War was referred to as “the war 
without a name”.21 French authorities at the time depended on such descriptors 
as “pacification” or “peace-keeping” and this denial of what really happened 
in Algeria created an absence of language - one of Maurice Halbwachs’ key 
social frames of memory - with which to speak of the events, thus hindering 
remembering. On 28 February 1999 a plaque was laid on the Arc de Triomphe 
that reads “To those who died for France during the Algerian War and the 
Conflicts in Tunisia and Morocco, 1952-62”. Veterans in particular applauded 
this long overdue recognition of the reality of what they had lived through as 
young men that came about largely due to their campaigning. 
This gradual shift in the public discourses around the conflict began in 
September 1997 when Jean-Pierre Masseret, Secretary of State for Veterans, 
first gave a speech in which he used the term “the Algerian War.”22 The process 
was in a sense concluded on 10 June 1999, when the French Parliament passed 
a law making official the use of the term “Algerian War” in legal texts. Jean-
Pierre Masseret personally played an essential role in this process and veterans’ 
associations (through lobbying) were important in generating the necessary 
momentum. Masseret became a member of the Socialist-led government in 1997 
which partly explains the timing of these moves but, it is important to note that 
from the late 1990s the veterans seemed to be wielding more and more influence 
demographically, socially, and politically. Perhaps this is due to the fact that 
many veterans were about to or were beginning to take retirement at this time, 
thus giving them more opportunity to invest time and energy in the activities 
of veterans’ associations. Previous studies have also shown the way in which as 
people grow older they may want to come to terms with, and transmit, memories 
that they previously repressed.23 Distance between the event being remembered 
and the present may also facilitate remembering.
Changes too have taken place at sites of memory.24 At the local level, 
thousands of “rues du 19 mars” (19 March Street) or steles have been created. 
A prominent veterans association, the FNACA, spearheaded this drive to 
memorialize using street names, by drawing on its strength, particularly at local 
level and in relation to local government.25 At the departmental level, almost 
every department now has its memorial. At the same time, a national memorial 
was created at Quai Bondy. It takes the form of three pillars, each with a list of 
names of victims that continually scrolls. There has also been greater recognition 
of the events of 17 October 1961, around sites of memory such as the plaque on 
the Saint Michel bridge in central Paris. Inaugurated by Bertrand Delanoë, Mayor 
of Paris, and member of the French Socialist Party, the plaque reads “In memory 
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of the numerous Algerians killed during the bloody repression of the peaceful 
demonstration of 17 October 1961”. The death of François Mitterrand in 1996, 
who had been Home Affairs Minister in the French government in 1954 at the 
beginning of the Algerian War, and the post-1997 return of the Left to power in 
the government led by Lionel Jospin undoubtedly helped advance discussions 
of the Algerian War during this period. Some aspects of the war, such as the 
events of 17 October 1961, resonate more fully with the Left. Political activism 
is definitely a key explanatory factor here. When Jim House and Neil MacMaster 
have come to analyse ‘how and why the memories of 17 October reinvested 
French society from the 1980s onwards, often as part of wider “memory battles” 
over the Algerian War’, they have concluded that,
One key explanatory factor lies with the concerns of activists of Algerian 
origin, many of whose parents demonstrated on 17 October. These descendants 
of Algerians often came across 17 October via resilient counter-memories of 
French former anti-colonial activists rather than memory transmission within 
their own Algerian families.26 
Harkis (Algerian soldiers who fought in the French army) have also received 
greater official recognition by the French State in the recent past. The history of 
the harkis was for many years regarded as one of the most occluded aspects of the 
Algerian War.27 They too now have received a site of memory, a plaque in the 
Invalides in Paris that reads: “The French Republic acknowledges its gratitude to 
the repatriated members of additional and assimilated forces or victims of captivity 
in Algeria for the sacrifices that they made”. This memorial was inaugurated 
during the first National Day of Homage to the Harkis on 25 September 2001. 
Initially a one-off, this is now an annual commemoration. Here too activism 
has played a key role, as has a change in generation since it is the “sons and 
daughters of harkis” who have protested most actively. Sons have protested in 
regular demonstrations since 197428  and daughters of harkis have recently used 
writing very effectively29. William Cohen believes political considerations are 
crucial to understanding this shift in memorialization: “The harkis, believed to be 
four hundred thousand strong in France, represented a significant electorate that 
needed wooing, so their cause was also being exploited by political rivals”.30
The last ten years have undoubtedly witnessed a move by the French State 
and government to acknowledge the Algerian War far more than previously. Part 
of this shift can be explained by political considerations: the moderate right in 
particular has been keen to win over elements that might otherwise vote for 
the National Front. The National Front has traditionally drawn considerable 
support from former settlers, OAS members and harkis.31 Another explanation 
is more personal. Jacques Chirac (President of France, 1995-2007), for example, 
fought in Algeria. Chirac was twenty-three when he arrived in Algeria to lead 
thirty-two men between April 1956 and June 1957. He then returned to Algeria 
between July 1959 and March 1960 as a functionary. While Chirac was for some 
the “president of the duty of memory,” President Nicolas Sarkozy seems intent on 
ending what he sees as the trend towards “repentance.” Chirac personally played 
a leading role in much State level “work of memory, such as his 1995 recognition 
that France had committed “l’irréparable” (that which cannot be made up for) 
during the Vichy years.32 The Vichy period was very much the affair of the 
previous President of France, François Mitterrand. The “Algerian generation”, 
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on the other hand, was much more directly Jacques Chirac’s generation, as it was 
a war in which he fought. Yet it is not at all clear that the generational change 
from Chirac to Sarkozy will facilitate French society’s examination of its colonial 
past. It is also far from clear that the civil society has been particularly involved 
in these moves. My own work has shown the extent of lack of transmission of 
memories of the war in the three crucial vectors of the education system, the 
media, and the family.33
The Algerian War is little taught in schools. The wider subjects of 
Decolonization and the French Fourth/Fifth Republics are covered, but this 
leaves little room for the Algerian War itself. In other words, pupils may learn 
about Empires and their respective ends, but touch little on any specific account 
of French involvement in Algeria. There is virtually no time to invite veterans to 
class or to show films on the subject in an education system that is pedagogically 
very teacher centered. This treatment contrasts strongly with the teaching of 
the Second World War and the Vichy regime, which amounts to a quarter of the 
terminale (final year of high school) program. Unfortunately, the school system 
is unable to present much of the French historiography of the conflict produced 
since the early 1990s, and consequently the “memory battles” or “selective 
memories” that circulate in society cannot be engaged by historical knowledge. 
Few pages of textbooks are devoted to the war in Algeria, nor are many questions 
set on the topic at the baccalauréat (high school certificate) examination.
Similarly, it is rare for pupils to hear much about the Algerian War from 
their family. Veterans of the war in particular have been notoriously silent on 
the topic, for a variety of reasons, which include trauma, the sheer difficulty of 
confronting the experience and also a lack of interest from French society. All 
work in this area points to the silences and lack of dialogue in the millions of 
families affected by the war.34 This body of work examines a number of different 
groups that participated in various ways in the Franco-Algerian War—such as 
harkis, settlers, Algerian workers in France, or veterans. The common thread is a 
reluctance to talk about the war, particularly with family members.
One exception to this trend of the State-level domination of the re-working 
the Franco-Algerian War is “work of memory” in the media. This is another area 
that has proved very polemical. The media in recent years have been at the center 
of renewed examination of the Algerian War by French society. Throughout 
2000 there was considerable media coverage in France on one of the most taboo 
aspects of the Algerian War: the French army’s use of torture.35 Prior to this, the 
subject of torture was very rarely evoked and its discussion was limited to periodic 
eruptions occasioned by the publication in the early 1970s of General Massu’s 
book La Vraie bataille d’Alger (The Real Battle of Algiers); or after the screening 
in France of Gillo Pontecorvo’s film La Bataille d’Alger (The Battle of Algiers); or 
the discussion in the early 1980s of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s activities in Algeria.36 
This wave of media coverage lasted two years and has been described as a “very 
polemical and mediatized reactivation of the memory of the Algerian war”.37 The 
coverage began in Le Monde when the paper first published the testimony of 
Louisette Ighilahriz. Ighilahriz described how she had been tortured by French 
forces and alleged that high ranking French army officers had been present, 
specifically Generals Jacques Massu and Marcel Bigeard—the former headed the 
Tenth Division of the French Paratroopers during the Battle of Algiers in 1957. 
In response to these allegations, Massu and Bigeard also published their own 
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accounts in the paper, and over time other officers such as Generals Maurice 
Schmitt and Paul Aussaresses—the latter published the book Services Spéciaux: 
Algérie 1955-57 (Special Services: Algeria 1955-57) in 2001—were also accused of 
human rights violations.38 Judging by readers’ letters, the coverage of the topic 
was polemical rather than reconciliatory.
Discussion of the Algerian War is still very difficult, particularly at a personal 
level. It is therefore to be expected that the State-level work of memory, first of all 
encouraged by the most active elements of civil society (early memory activists), 
and now followed by a broader section of civil society (film makers), will take 
time to impact on individuals and groups affected by the Algerian War. 
Conclusion
Social memories of the Franco-Algerian War in France were for many years 
profoundly repressed and occluded, reflecting the immense trauma, shame and 
bitterness of a painful defeat. Individuals who participated in the Algerian War 
struggled to articulate what they had endured, people close to them often did not 
want to discuss those events, and the French government encouraged silence on 
the topic for the sake of national unity. However, over time, slowly but surely, 
such memories have evolved and emerged. What were once resolutely private 
memories have slowly entered the public sphere, often periodically around key 
commemorations (thirtieth and fortieth anniversaries of the end of the war in 
1992 and 2002 respectively) and after a period of two or three decades as the 
participants have aged and retired and their children or grandchildren have 
grown up. The tireless work of “memory activists,” from writers and scholars to 
political activists and filmmakers, has since the 1960s helped to shape a more 
clearly visible set of social memories. An acceleration in this process has occurred 
in France since the late 1990s, with a key shift in the stance of the French 
government and State, that had played such a key role previously in occluding 
memories of the war, and a number of explanations have been offered for these 
developments.
Given the variety of ways in which memories of Algeria have emerged, 
and the complex picture of repression and occlusion followed by progressive 
development of social memories, a number of theories of social memories need 
to be referred to in order to understand these patterns. These should reference 
the work of Maurice Halbwachs with his focus on the social frames of memory 
and the present social construction of memories. More psychological accounts of 
memory can shed light on the repression of memories. The passage of generations, 
both political (from Presidents Mitterrand to Chirac) and personal (from first 
generation migrants to their sons and daughters or grandchildren), helps explain 
how previously repressed events have slowly been uncovered. Lastly, the breadth 
of ways in which memories have been articulated in recent decades can be 
understood by reference to plural models of social memory that emphasize the 
role of individuals and groups in activating memories, such as that defended by 
Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan. 
There has clearly been an important shift in social memories of the Algerian 
War in France over the last ten years. However, upon closer inspection, we can 
note that social memories of the Algerian War still clearly concern groups. In 1990 
Jean-Pierre Rioux pointed to the lack of any national memory of the Algerian War, 
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and highlighted the number of group memories that existed. Benjamin Stora too 
has identified what he calls “cloistered memories.” Although the French State has 
acknowledged the plight of various groups in recent years, it has done so group by 
group. At present, the broader frames of memory that could move across groups, 
such as the education system, are not able to provide a forum for cross-group 
discussion. Although, as Stora has pointed out, “recognition” is a step forward 
from “knowledge” of what took place,39 we might also hope in coming years that 
discussion of France’s role in Algeria is enlarged, more sustained and allows the 
various groups involved in the Algerian War to reconsider each other. There 
is a division between traditional Republican approaches to memory and more 
postcolonial challenges to this40, in so far as the traditional Republican model 
fears what Pierre Nora has termed a balkanization of memory and emphasizes the 
need for unity whereas memory activists like Yamina Benguigui, Mehdi Charef 
and Philippe Bernard believe that working through memories of the Algerian 
War is essential to the process of integration of ethnic minorities. The French 
State has now been able to integrate certain groups (such as soldiers and settlers) 
more centrally into the National narrative, and it remains to be seen if, to what 
extent, and how that inclusion will be extended to other groups and consolidated 
or developed in future years.
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